ROBERT B. TALISSE 186
fundamental moral matters prevails. This is the nonconvergence component of pluralism.
Different versions of pluralism offer competing versions of the nonconvergence thesis. In the metaphysical version offered by Isaiah Berlin and others, nonconvergence is due to the nature of value. On Berlinian views, different objective goods bear relations of intrinsic hostility to other objective goods, and there is no summum bonum by reference to which competing goods may be rank-ordered. As different goods make their respective claims on us, there are many ways of addressing moral conflicts that are consistent with the full employment of reason. Epistemic version of pluralism, by contrast, need make no claims regarding the nature of value; epistemic pluralisms hold that nonconvergence is the result of some fact of moral epistemology. On such views, human reason, even at its best, is not up to the task of finding uniquely rational solutions to moral dilemmas; hence many solutions are consistent with the proper exercise of human reason, despite their being inconsistent with each other. As the view aspires to be strictly epistemological, epistemic pluralism need not take a stand on the question of whether there are uniquely rational solutions to moral conflicts; epistemic pluralism says only that we have not proven able to reach such solutions, and thus there are several distinctive and mutually incompatible options available to reasonable people.
In both cases, nonconvergence is held to be in some sense permanent. Clanton and Forcehimes correctly identify a stronger and a weaker version of the nonconvergence thesis. The strong nonconvergentism holds that widespread reasoned agreement, or consensus, on fundamental moral questions is in principle unavailable. Weaker nongonvergentism holds the more modest view that consensus is not to be expected. Accordingly, both versions hold that widespread agreement, when it appears to exist, should be treated with suspicion; the strong view holds such consensus as proof of suppression, the weak version holds that consensus strongly suggests suppression. Metaphysical pluralists tend to be strong nonconvergentists, and weak non-convergence tends to be favored by epistemic pluralists. To be sure, some epistemic pluralists arguably are strong nonconvergentists, but we need not pursue this matter here.
With this rough taxonomy in place, I turn to the argument. Clanton and Forcehimes hold that, although Deweyan democracy is indeed inconsistent with strong nonconvergentism, strong nonconvergentism is also inconsistent with the Peircean epistemology that lies at the root of my positive view. They contend that strong nonconvergentism, if true, would render Peircean inquiry impotent. They argue that the possibility of convergence is a regulative assumption of inquiry, and strong nonconvergentism denies this possibility.
I reject strong nonconvergentism; however I do not think that it is necessarily inconsistent with Peircean inquiry. Even if we suppose, with the strong nonconvergentist, that some question, Q, is underdetermined by all the evidence there could be, inquiry could still yield results concerning which proposed answers to Q are nonviable. In other words, even if we suppose that
